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Policies to tax farmers in low-income countries and policies to subsidize them in 
high-income countries have been identified as a major source of the disequilibrium of 
world agriculture. Recently, as many high-performing economies in Asia advanced from 
the low-income to the middle-income stage through successful industrialization, they are 
confronted with the problem of a widening income gap between farm and non-farm 
workers corresponding to rapid shifts in comparative advantage from agriculture to 
manufacturing. In order to prevent this disparity from culminating in serious social and 
political instability, policies have been reoriented toward supporting the income of 
farmers. At the same time, governments in middle-income countries must continue to 
secure low-cost food to the urban poor who are still large in number. The need to achieve 
the two conflicting goals under the still weak fiscal capacity of governments tends to 
make agricultural policies in the middle-income stage tinkering and ineffective. Greater 
research inputs in this area are called for in order to prevent the growth momentum of 
high-performing economies in Asia from being disrupted by political crises, as illustrated 





This paper aims to identify the nature of a new agricultural problems emerging in high-performing 
economies in Asia, as they have advanced from low-income to middle-income stage. The 
“agricultural problem” is here defined as the problem of an overriding concern to policymakers 
with respect to designing and implementing policies for agriculture as part of policies to promote 
national economic development in their own country. As such, it may well be called the “basic 
problem in determining agricultural policies”.   2
For a past half century East Asia has been the growth pole of the world economy. Japan’s 
jump from a middle-income to a high-income economy associated with very rapid 
industrialization in the two decades from the 1950s was followed by a more compressed growth of 
so-called Asian NIES – Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore – from the 1960s. Equally 
remarkable in this period was the advancement of low-income agrarian economies in Southeast 
Asia, such as Indonesia and Thailand, to the middle income stage. Within three decades from the 
1960s they were able to achieve significant industrialization with the major share of their export 
shifting from primary to manufactured commodities. Shortly after the take-off of these 
high-performing economies in the Association of South-East Asia (ASEAN), China began to 
emerge as “the workshop of the world” with its successful market-oriented reforms. This 
experience has been followed by another transitional economy in East Asia, Vietnam. 
Furthermore, it appears that this ‘East Asian Miracle’ (World Bank 1993) is now being transmitted 
to South Asia, where India and Bangladesh have seen accelerating economic growth rates since the 
1990s, though they have not yet escaped from the low-income status. 
As high-performing developing economies in Asia have advanced or will advance to a 
middle-income stage, they are bound to face a new agricultural problem. What is the nature of this 
problem? What is its root? What policies might be appropriate and effective in solving the 
problem? These are the questions addressed in this paper.  
Following this introduction, the next section defines three agricultural problems, each 
corresponding to a major development stage．The third section elaborates on the political 
economy mechanism giving rise to a unique problem in the middle-income stage.The fourth 
section gives a historical perspective in terms of the experiences of Thailand and Japan. The final 
concludes with a plea for more serious research on this problem for sustaining development of 
high-performing economies in Asia. 
 
 
Three agricultural Problems  
 
 
First, the nature of the agricultural problem in the middle-income stage is specified in comparison 
with the problems confronted by the low-income and high-income countries. In his classic treatise, 
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Schultz (1953) specified the two different agricultural problems confronted by low-income and 
high-income economies. The ‘food problem’ in his terms is the problem faced by low-income 
economies; these economies characterized by rapid population growth and high food demand 
elasticity are under the constant risk to be beset by shortage in the supply of food relative to 
demand; the resulting high food prices raising the costs of living and the wage rates of workers in 
non-farm sectors and thereby suppressing industrialization and overall economic growth; 
therefore, the prime policy concern in low-income economies is to prevent food shortage from 
occurring. Schultz argued that the ‘farm problem’ faced by high-income economies is 
diametrically different form the food problem; population growth slow down and food 
consumption is saturated in the high-income stage, while the food production capacity is 
strengthened due to their ability to advance technology; therefore, high-income economies have a 
chronic tendency for food demand to be exceeded by supply with the result that food prices and 
farm incomes decline; under the powerful lobbying by farmers, agricultural policies in 
high-income economies are mainly geared toward preventing farm incomes from falling; their 
demand for agricultural protection policies tends to be easily accepted because high-income 
consumers are lenient to high food prices and farm subsidies. 
Later, Schultz (1978) identified these two agricultural problems as underlying the policies 
to exploit or tax agriculture commonly adopted in low-income countries in contrast to the policies 
to protect or subsidize agriculture in high-income countries. His hypothesis has been established as 
a paradigm among agricultural economists as it found support from several empirical studies 
(Anderson and Hayami 1986; Hayami 1988; Krueger et al. 1991). Under the serious constraint of 
foreign exchange common among low-income economies, it is generally not feasible for them to 
counteract food shortage and rising food prices by increasing commercial imports. Instead, 
lowering domestic food prices by such means as taxation on food exports, government compulsory 
procurement of farm products from producers at lower-than-market prices and accepting that 
foreign dumping in domestic markets is commonly practiced in low-income countries for securing 
the supply of cheap food to non-farm workers at the expense of farmers. In contrast, policies to 
raise agricultural product prices by such means as border protection and domestic production 
control are commonly used in high-income countries for supporting farmers’ incomes at the 
expense of consumers and taxpayers. In this paper, the agricultural problem underlying policies to 
depress food prices and farm incomes in low-income countries is called the “food problem” 
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following Schultz’s terminology, but the agricultural problem underlying policies to support farm 
incomes in high-income countries is called the “protection problem”, instead of Schultz’s “farm 
problem” or Hayami’s (1988) “agricultural adjustment problem”.  
Despite the change in terminology, I adopt as the basic framework the Schultz theory on 
the two agricultural problems. In addition, I would propose it useful to identify another agricultural 
problem specifically faced by middle-income countries. This problem is brought about by a lag in 
productivity growth in agriculture behind non-agriculture as a result of the successful 
industrialization that raised these economies to a middle-income stage. At this stage as compared 
with the previous low-income stage, the food supply capacity rises and factors causing demand 
growth are weakened, but people’s per-capita incomes do not yet reach a level at which food 
consumption is completely saturated as in the high-income economies. As a result, the terms of 
trade between agriculture and non-agriculture remain largely stable, despite significant decreases 
in agriculture’s productivity relative to non-agriculture due to rapid progress in industrialization. 
Therefore, farmers’ income levels tend to decline relative to non-farmers’ corresponding to the 
widening inter-sectoral productivity gap. By observing non-farm workers’ rapid escape from 
poverty, farmers who are left behind begin to realize how poor they are, even if their income level 
did not decrease or even slightly increased from the previous stage. Dissatisfaction of the farm 
population who remained poor, despite visible improvements in other sectors often became a 
significant source of social instability. Thus, at the middle-income stage, it becomes a prime 
concern of policymakers to prevent rural-urban income disparity from widening. This agricultural 
problem is here called the “disparity problem”. It is by nature the problem of income disparity 
between the farm and the non-farm sectors. This problem is looming large and will continue to 
become more serious among high-performing economies in Asia as they advance to the 
middle-income stage upon their success in industrialization. 
 
 
The political equilibrium of the disparity problem  
 
 
The disparity problem is considered a political equilibrium in which the political influences of 
farm and non-farm interests are more or less balanced. Figure 2 illustrate how the objective of 
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politicians in designing agricultural policies changes in the process of economic development. The 
food-problem becomes dominant where politicians’ major concern, in order to stay in office, is 
how to secure low-price food to urban dwellers; and the protection-problem becomes dominant 
where their major concern is how to keep farmers’ income level balanced with non-farm workers. 
In contrast, the disparity-problem emerges where these two concerns are more or less equally 
important.  
At the stage in which the disparity-problem is dominant, the prime concern of politicians is 
to relieve farmers from poverty. However, ‘poverty’ here means not absolute poverty but relative 
poverty. Absolute poverty among farm population is less severe in middle-income countries than 
low-income countries. In the middle-income stage, with the progress of industrialization by means 
of borrowing technology from developed countries, newly-risen well-to-do families, including 
workers employed in large-scale modern enterprises, form a new social class in urban areas 
enjoying a modern comfortable life. Observing the income difference from the newly-risen urban 
families, farmers become envious and eventually develop grudge against the social system to keep 
them in poverty, which may culminate in social disruptions.  
This relative poverty problem is closely related with the so-called ‘dual structure’which 
emerged in the process of industrialization. The dual structure refers to the situation characterized 
by the coexistence between a formal sector consisting of large-scale, capital-intensive enterprises 
paying high wages to their employees and an informal sector consisting of small-scale, 
labor-intensive enterprises based on cheap labor. The formal sector is largely closed to laborers in 
the informal sector including employees in small-scale enterprises, casual laborers working on a 
daily contract basis, and self-employed manufactures and traders. With labor codes and unions 
exclusively applicable to large-scale enterprises their labor costs are high despite the abundant 
availability of low-wage laborers in the informal sector. Therefore, strong incentives are at work 
among entrepreneurs in the formal sector to increase capital intensity by adopting labor-saving 
technologies. As a result, employment increases much slower than output increases. The income 
gap tends to widen cumulatively between employees in the formal and the informal sectors.  
Typically the informal sector functions as a buffer in the labor market. Many small-scale 
enterprises engage in production as subcontractors of large-scale enterprises. Since employment in 
the formal sector is largely permanent, large-scale enterprises prefer to reduce orders to 
subcontractors during an economic slump rather than to lay off their own employees. 
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Correspondingly, many laborers in the informal sector who came from farm households lose work 
opportunities in cities and are forced to return to family in home villages. In addition to the 
economic burden of feeding these returnees, farmers face sharp drops in farm product prices 
during recessions because of low price-elasticity of food demand. In this way, during economic 
recessions, farmers suffer from dire poverty, intensifying their grudge against urban people.  
Supported by the sympathy of the intelligentsia, farmers’ dissatisfaction may elevate to 
serious anti-governmental movements. So, the government is forced to adopt agricultural 
protection measures. However, this protection cannot be strong enough to negate the income gap 
between farmers and urban workers, unlike in the high-income stage. Since the shares of 
agriculture in both national income and labor force still remain large, it is impossible for the 
government in the middle-income stage to secure sufficient finance for closing the growing gap. In 
addition, increases in food prices result in a major loss to a large number of small-scale enterprises 
in urban area, which rely heavily on cheap labor. Developing countries can advance from the 
low-income to the middle-income stage by technology borrowing from developed countries. 
However, the successful industrialization by means of technology borrowing tends to result in the 
formation of a dual structure in the economy and the widening of income disparity between 
farmers and newly-risen urban families. Under the dictate of this disparity problem, policymakers 
in middle-income countries are forced to muddle around in search of ways and means to protect 
farmers within the constraint of the food problem that is still binding because a large number of 
workers in urban informal sectors are still absolutely poor. As their Engel coefficients are high, 
high food prices could well raise the cost of living above their meager incomes.  
The tendency of relative poverty to rise in the middle-income stage can be seen in Table 1. 
Note that my analysis here ends at 1995, for the sake of avoiding influences of the Asian Financial 
Crisis that began in 1997. In Table 1, farmers’ relative income is measured by dividing 
agriculture’s share in GDP by agriculture’s share in employment. In low-income countries, 
farmers’ relative income was 40-60 percent which is not so low compared with middle-income 
countries. In particular, in Tanzania and Ethiopia, which recorded zero-percent growth for 
1965-95, there was no decrease in farmers’ relative income. In Bangladesh and India, which 
recorded moderate economic growth, farmers’ relative income dropped slightly. In Indonesia and 
Thailand, which recorded high growth and escaped from the low-income stage during this period, 
farmers’ relative income declined sharply. In the Philippines, which lagged behind East Asian 
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Miracle growth, farmers’ relative income did not drop. Interestingly, there was no decrease in 
farmers’ relative income in high-income countries where the government could afford to spend 
sufficient budgets for supporting farmers’ incomes. 
Underlying this widening income gap between farm and non-farm sectors is the rapid shift 
in comparative advantage away from agriculture to industry, as illustrated in Table 2. In this table, 
changes in comparative advantages are compared among selected countries in terms of labor 
productivity growth in agriculture relative to that of manufacturing. Among developing countries, 
India, the Philippines and Korea are selected as representatives of low-, lower-middle-, and 
upper-middle- income stages, respectively.  
In developed countries, there was no significant difference in growth rate of labor 
productivity between the agricultural and the manufacturing sectors. On the other hand, in 
developing countries, labor productivity in manufacturing increased much faster than in 
agriculture, indicating comparative advantage in agriculture declined in developing countries and 
increased in developed countries. The inter-sectoral differences in labor productivity growth were 
especially large in the Philippines and Korea. This is consistent with the observation that food 
imports increased especially fast in middle-income countries (Hayami and Godo 2004, p. 6).  
Likely underlying this increase in comparative advantage in manufacturing among 
developing countries is the greater difficulty of technology transfer from developed to developing 
countries in agriculture than in manufacturing. Because agricultural production is a biological 
process, it is critically influenced by natural environments which are difficult to control artificially. 
Therefore, superior farming methods and plant varieties developed in advanced countries located 
in the temperate zone can not readily be applied in developing countries under tropical 
environments. In contrast, manufacturing production is largely a mechanical process operated in 
the controlled environments of factories, so that its technology is much easier to transfer from 
developed countries to developing countries. In this way, agriculture’s comparative advantage 
tends to decline in developing countries, especially in middle-income countries achieving rapid 
industrialization by technology- borrowing from developed countries.  
The speed of decline in agriculture’s comparative advantage is likely to exceed the speed 
of labor transfer from agriculture to manufacturing under the regime of emerging dual structure 
characterized by the low rate of labor absorption in the formal sector. To that extent the income 
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disparity between farmers and the employees of formal manufacturing and service enterprises 






A more concrete grasp of the process by which the disparity problem dominates agricultural policy 
formulation as economies advance from the low-income to the middle-income stage may be 
obtained by examining histories of the nations that underwent such a transformation. For this 
purpose the histories of Thailand during the period after the Second World War and of Japan 
between the First and Second World Wars shall be reviewed in this section. 
 
The experience of Thailand 
 
First, the experience of Thailand is examined as a typical example of high-performing economies 
in Asia currently experiencing the disparity problem.Indeed, the growth performance of Thai 
economy in the past half century was dramatic. Before the 1960s, Thailand was a low-income 
economy dependent on the production and export of primary commodities, rice above all. Before 
1960, average GDP per capita remained largely stagnant at the level of about 500 US dollars (in 
1990 prices) with the share of industrial products in total export being only about 10 percent 
(Douangngeune et al. 2005). However, within only two decades from 1960, Thailand suddenly 
jumped up to a middle-income status based on the success of labor-intensive industrialization; by 
the end of the 1970s the export share of industrial products rose to about 40 percent and GDP per 
capita more than doubled to the level of about 1200 dollars. Thereafter, the industrial sector in 
Thailand was further strengthened, beginning to develop high-tech industries such as automobile 
and electronics. Correspondingly, within only a decade and half before the 1997 Asian Financial 
Crisis, per-capita GDP again more than doubled and the export share of industrial products 
exceeded 70 percent. Even though the Thai economy suffered severely from the 1997 Crisis, it was 
able to return to the track of high growth in about three years. 
It was inevitable that the rise of Thailand from a low-income to a middle-income country 
based on dramatic industrial development was associated with the widening of income disparity 
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between agriculture and the rest of economy, as already observed in Table 1. Increasing income 
disparity between rural and urban sectors should have been parallel with the widening income gap 
between workers in urban formal and informal sectors. The disparity increased as the development 
of capital- and knowledge-intensive industries created a dual structure. Altogether, inequality in 
income distribution in Thailand, as measured by the Gini coefficient in Figure 2, increased 
significantly as the economy advanced to the middle-income stage. 
In this process both farmers and workers in the urban informal sector were not absolutely 
worse off. Instead, they should have improved their absolute income levels, as reflected in 
continued reduction in the share of population below the poverty line (the head-count index) 
despite increases in the Gini coefficient. Nevertheless, they must have developed frustration on 
their being poor or becoming poorer in comparison with the rising standard of living of 
formal-sector employees. Thus, upon successful reduction of absolute poverty, Thailand began to 
be confronted with the problem of relative poverty. 
Since the majority of the poor were staking out a subsistence in agriculture, policies to 
support farmers’ incomes became an important agenda for politicians to prevent income inequality 
from rising to a socially disastrous level. Also, the spread of primary education and the 
improvements of communication and transportation infrastructure in rural areas increased both 
farmers’ awareness of their being ‘unfairly’ treated relative to urban dwellers as well as their 
ability to organize political lobbies to demand a ‘fair deal’. Thus, in the process of advancing from 
a low-income to a middle-income stage, Thai politicians were pressed to change their policy 
objective from taxing agriculture for solving the food problem to supporting farmers for solving 
the disparity problem. 
This change in policy orientation in Thailand is most clearly observable in changes in 
taxation on rice exports. As a major exporter of rice, taxation on rice exports represented a 
convenient and effective instrument for taxing agriculture for the purpose of income transfer from 
farm producers to consumers and taxpayers. Several instruments were used for taxing rice exports 
in Thailand, including quantitative restriction (export quota) and imposition of obligations on 
exporters to submit a certain share of rice export to the government at lower-than-market prices 
(so-called ‘rice reserve requirement’), all of which had the effect of lowering domestic prices 
below international prices. However, by far the most important instrument used by the Thai 
government was the ‘rice premium’, a kind of specific duty levied proportional to export 
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quantities. At the low-income stage, the rice premium was a critically important source of 
government revenue and, at the same time, acted as a mechanism of supplying rice to domestic 
consumers at lower-than-world market prices. Further, it had the power to protect consumers from 
the vagaries of world markets by increasing (reducing) the premium when world market prices 
rose (dropped) so as to stabilize domestic prices. Thus, the rice premium was a highly effective 
policy instrument to serve for the dual purpose of raising government revenue and securing supply 
of cheap food to urban consumers by means of taxing agriculture at the stage when the food 
problem was dominant in the formulation of agricultural policies (Siwamwalla 1987; Siwamwalla 
and Sethboonsarny 1989). 
Figure 3 draws changes in rice premium in comparison with changes in the nominal rate of 
protection (NRP). NRP aims to measure the divergence of the domestic price from the border 
price. Here it is calculated as the rate of difference of the domestic wholesale price from the export 
price, fob, Bangkok, for the grade of rice 5-percent broken. To the extent that rice exports are 
taxed, domestic prices diverge below border export prices, resulting in negative values of NRP. 
NRP includes the effects of not only the rice premium but also other taxation instruments, but the 
dominant role of the premium is evident from the high negative correlation between movements in 
the premium rate and NRP. Data in Figure 3 show that, before the mid-1970s when Thailand was 
in a low-income stage, the rice premium rate remained high at the level of about 30 percent of the 
border price, and NRP was as high as about 50 percent; this implies that nearly half the values of 
farmers’ rice sales were transferred to non-farm sectors including the government through the 
export taxation. For a decade since then, however, as Thailand advanced to the middle-income 
stage, the rice premium had been reduced till its abolishment in 1986. This change should have 
reflected the rise of the disparity problem. 
Beside the reduction of export taxation, the emerging need to prevent rural-urban disparity 
from further widening pressed politicians to install more visible measures for the support of 
farmers. During the political instability of the mid-1970s involving student riots and military 
coups, this pressure culminated in the establishment of the Farmers’ Aid Fund in 1974. Based on 
large rice premium revenue corresponding to sharp increases in world rice prices in the so-called 
‘World Food Crisis’ of 1973-75, the Fund tried to undertake several programs to support farmers, 
such as farmer credit, fertilizer subsidy, and public work using rural labor for the construction of 
rural infrastructure. Among them a program organized in a significant scale attempted to support 
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rice prices through the purchase of rice by government agencies. However, the program totally 
failed to achieve its intended goal, partly because of poor design and inefficient implementation 
due to lack of experience and skill in government procurement agencies but more critically 
because the budget that the Fund could allocate was too small to significantly influence market 
prices (Siwamwalla 1987). This program was soon terminated as the rice premium revenue 
decreased corresponding to declines in world rice prices after the Food Crisis period. 
This failure of the price support program organized by the Farmers’ Aid Fund epitomizes 
the difficulty in formulating appropriate policies to cope with the disparity problem. First of all, the 
program was contradictory as it tries to support farmers based on the revenue from taxation on 
them; this contradiction arose from the fact that the government tax base outside agriculture was 
still insufficient to support farmers adequately in the middle-income stage. Second, if the program 
were really successful in raising domestic rice prices, it should have met strong opposition and 
protest from the urban poor outside the formal sector. Here is the dilemma of the disparity problem 
under which supplying cheap food to the urban poor and preventing farmers from becoming 
poorer relative to non-farm workers are more or less important for politicians.  
It must be very difficult for middle-income countries to escape from this dilemma. 
Thailand, for example, tried to introduce an export subsidy on rice for further increasing support 
on farmers after the abolishment of the rice premium. As yet, however, the export subsidy has been 
negligibly small. The large application of an export subsidy would not have been possible as it is 
against the WTO rule. However, even before the GATT Uruguay Round Agreement in 1993, Thai 
government indicated no sign to greatly expand the export subsidy scheme. This was presumably 
because of both the budgetary constraint and the danger to raise food prices for the urban poor.  
Since the mid-1980s, the Thai government has introduced a commodity credit program 
akin to a program operated by the Commodity Credit Corporation in the United States in the past. 
By this program farmers can receive low-interest loans from the government for the pledge of their 
rice until the rice price increases. In the event that the price will not rise sufficiently, they can 
relinquish their debt by submitting the pledged rice to the government. This is a high-cost program 
unsustainable even in the United States. It is doubtful if this program can be expanded to such a 
scale as to render sufficient income support for farmers in a middle-income country. 
As industrialization in Thailand progresses, comparative advantage in agriculture will 
decline further. For closing the rural-urban income gap, the government will continue to increase 
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supports on farmers in various fronts, including subsidies on inputs and credits as well as price 
supports. Yet, it is unlikely that Thailand will able to expand the support programs to such a scale 
as to fully close the income gap before its economy will advance to a high-income stage.  
 
The experience of Japan 
 
The current problem in Thailand at the middle-income stage, as reviewed in the previous section, 
may be better understood by comparing it with the economic transformation of Japan from the 
low-income to the high-income stage. Table 3 presents a synopsis of modern economic 
development in Japan from 1885 to 1995. Japan and Thailand opened to international trade at 
about the same time under the pressure of the West; both were forced to sign unequal treaties – 
Thailand with the United Kingdom in 1855 and Japan with the United States in 1858. Despite this 
similarity, industrialization progressed much faster in Japan than in Thailand, probably owing to 
much scarcer endowments of natural resources, especially land for cultivation, making it more 
urgent in Japan to industrialize than in Thailand for surviving under open international trade 
(Bounlouane et al. 2005). At any rate, in terms of per-capita GDP data in Table 3 (Column 1), it 
appears that Japan was able to approach the middle-income stage by the first decade of the 20th 
century. Until the First World War, Japan’s industrialization had been predominantly based on the 
expansion of labor-intensive manufacturing. Later, heavy industries were promoted during the 
First World War and continued to be strengthened thereafter in the inter-war period. At that time a 
dual structure emerged and the rural-urban disparity became serious. 
Correspondingly, the focus of agricultural policies changed. Before the First World War, 
agricultural policies were mainly geared for increasing food production so as to counteract the 
food problem in the low-income stage. The adequate supply of cheap food, especially rice, was 
considered a critical support for the development of labor-intensive industries. For this end 
Japanese government invested heavily in agricultural research and extension as well as irrigation 
infrastructure for the development and diffusion of high-yielding varieties, initially within Japan 
and later to overseas territories, Korea and Taiwan. Such efforts were successful to overcome the 
food problem before the Second World War (Hayami 1975; Hayami and Ruttan 1985, Hayami and 
Yamada 1991). 
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Ironically, this success greatly aggravated the disparity problem during the inter-war 
period. As Column 5 of Table 3 shows, declines in labor productivity in agriculture’ relative to 
industry were very fast in Japan from the beginning of modern economic growth, reflecting very 
rapid progress in industrialization. Nevertheless, the terms of trade did not improve for agriculture 
(Column 6), so that income per capita in farmers’ households declined sharply relative to that in 
non-farm workers’ households (Column 7). These trends contrast sharply with those after the 
Second World War, when despite continued declines in relative productivity for agriculture, the 
per-capita income of farmers improved relative to non-farmers to the point of exceeding parity 
after the 1970s: this resulted from very rapid improvements in the terms of trade based on farm 
price support programs at a large scale unthinkable in the prewar days. Such a scale of farm 
supports became possible as Japan advanced to the high-income stage in the late 1960s.   
As the disparity problem loomed large, the farm bloc demanded increased government 
supports. Already in 1913, politically powerful landlords were successful in lobbying for the 
institution of a specific duty on rice imports, but it was not applied to rice produced in overseas 
territories within the Japanese Empire. When the price of rice began to fall after the First World 
War, the farm bloc pressed the government to support rice prices by means of procurement and 
storage of rice. In addition, the government developed various programs to assist farmers, 
including government spending on construction of physical infrastructure in rural areas in order to 
provide wage-earning opportunities and the release of low-interest loans from government to 
farmers heavily in debt from private money lenders.  
Tax burdens on farmers were also reduced. In the early stage of modernization in Japan, 
land tax levied from farmers was the major source of government revenue. During the 1880s the 
ratio of direct tax shouldered by farmers to their income was about 15 percent compared with only 
about 2 percent for non-farmers; this disparity largely remained even in the 1910s with the tax 
rates of about 11 percent for farmers and 5 percent for non-farmers, but by the late 1930s farmers’ 
tax rate was reduced to about 6 percent not so different from non-farmers (Hayami 1988, p. 40).  
These policies designed in Japan during the inter-war period in response to the emerging 
disparity problem were also very similar to those adopted in Thailand since the 1970s. Their 
consequences were similar. In spite of all these efforts, the level of income and the living standard 
of farmers did not appreciably improve. Unlike after the Second World War, the Japanese 
economy during the inter-war period did not reach the stage at which the government could afford 
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to undertake farm support programs at such a scale as to close the rural-urban income gap. 
Although heavy industries developed rapidly, light industries based on small- and medium-scale 
enterprises were still the backbone of the Japanese economy, especially with respect to foreign 
exchange earnings. Their international competitive power was still dependent on cheap labor, so 
that a major increase in the wage rate resulting from large increases food prices could not be 
tolerated. In such circumstances, with whatever powerful lobbying the landlords were able to 
organize, it was not politically possible to raise the level of agricultural protection sufficiently to 
solve the rising disparity problem. 
Very unfortunately, by the time the disparity problem became serious, Japan was plunged 
into the storm of the Great Depression of 1929. In Japan as well as throughout the world, farm 
product prices declined faster than the prices of manufacturers’ and farmers’ incomes dropped 
more than non-farm workers’. Growing dissatisfaction and frustration of farmers, who became 
poorer both absolutely and relatively, culminated in social disruptions including terrorism; this 






The growing imbalance in world agriculture today as epitomized in increasing food deficits in 
low-income economies in contrast with increasing surpluses in high-income economies have not 
simply been the results of different demand and supply structures corresponding to different 
income levels but it has been aggravated by policies under the dictate of the three agricultural 
problems in different stages of economic development -- the food problem in the low-income 
stage, the disparity problem in the middle-income stage and the protection problem in the 
high-income stage. 
Under the regime of the food problem, policymakers in low-income countries have 
inclined to adopt policies geared for securing low-priced food to urban consumers at the expense 
of farm producers. In contrast, under the regime of the protection problem, politicians in 
high-income countries have not been able to resist pressures from the farm lobby for instituting 
policies to raise farmers’ incomes to the level of non-farm workers. Great inefficiency and inequity 
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resulting from these contrasting policy distortions have already been amply documented (Johnson 
1973: Schultz 1978, Anderson and Hayami 1986), and the need to reduce these distortions has 
been widely recognized. In fact, major international collaborative efforts have progressed in that 
direction for the past two decades, through GATT/WTO multilateral trade negotiations. 
In contrast, the disparity problem has received relatively little attention. Yet, the growing 
income disparity between farm and non-farm population could be a major source of social and 
political instability for economies attempting to achieve catching up with high-income economies 
through industrialization by means of rapid technology borrowing. This problem is now spreading 
over Asia from ASEAN nations to China and Vietnam and will eventually reach South Asia, 
especially India.  
While right approaches to the food and the protection problems have already been 
established among economists, though actual implementation is often politically difficult, the right 
design to cope with the disparity problem has not yet been identified. The difficulty is how to 
compromise the conflicting goals to support farmers’ incomes on one hand and to secure the 
supply of low-cost food to a large number of workers in urban informal sectors in another, under 
the still weak capacity of the government to raise sufficient revenue from non-agricultural sectors. 
Almost inevitably, agricultural policies tend to become tinkering exercises combining various, 
often mutually conflicting policy instruments in ad hoc manners, as the experiences of Thailand 
and Japan illustrate. Greater research inputs in this area are called for in order to prevent the 
growth momentum of high-performing Asian economies from being disrupted, as experienced by 
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1995
1965-95       
average annual  
growth rate
1965 1995 1965 1995 1965 1995
($) (%)
Developing countries
Low-income countries   
Ethiopia
b 101 0.0 92 84 58 52 63 62
Tanzania 168 0.0
c 91 83 46 46 50 56
Bangladesh 324 1.3 86 61 41 25 47 41
India 387 2.2 74 62 44 28 59 46
Middle-income countries
Indonesia 992 4.7 71 52 56 17 79 33
Philippines 1,084 1.1 61 43 26 22 43 51
Thailand 2,771 5.4 82 60 32 11 39 18
Mexico 3,801 1.5 49 25 13 5 27 20
Korea 10,844 6.9 55 14 24 6 44 46
Developed countries
UK 18,848 1.9 3 2 3 2 92 96




USA 26,908 1.6 5 2 4 2 65 65
Japan 41,294 4.2 26 5 10 2 37
e 36
e
Notes a. Let, Na= employment in the agricultural sector; N=total employment, Ya=GDP in the agricultural sector;
    N=total employment, Ya=GDP in the agricultural sector; and Y=GDP.  Then, the last two columns give
    (Ya/Na)/(Y/N), which means the ratio of average income per farmer to per-capita GDP.
b. Ethiopia in 1965 includes Eritria
c. 1988-95 growth rate
d. 1977 value
e. A majority of Japanese farmers earn their living mainly by off-farm income.  If off-farm income is included,
    Japanese farmers' income level is on a par with urban counterparts' (Hayami, 1988).  
Sources Reproduced from Hayami and Godo(2004,p.14):
FAO, FAOSTAT Database, 2000.
World Bank, World Development Report, 1992.
World Bank, World Development Indicators CD-ROM, 2000.
Table 1. Comparison of per-capita GDP and agriculture's shares of economic active 
population and GDP
(1) (2) (3) (3)/(2)
Per-capita GDP
Agriculture's share 
in economic active 
population        
(percent)
Agriculture's share 





a             
(percent)
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Table 2. The average annual growth rates of real labor productivities in
agriculture and manufacturing in selected countries, 1965-95
Average growth rate per year of Rate of change 




USA 2.7 3.4 -0.7
UK 2.7 3.2 -0.5
France 5.2 3.6 1.6
Germany
a 5.1 4.0 1.1
Japan 5.1 5.5 -0.3
Average
b 4.2 3.9 0.2
Developing countries
Korea 5.3 11.0 -5.7
Philippines 1.4 10.2 -8.8
India 1.7 2.3 -0.7
Average
b 2.8 7.8 -5.0
Notes. a. 1965 values are estimated by aggrigating data for the Federal Republic of Germany and
those for the German Democratic Republic.
b. Simple average of sampled countries.
Sources. Reproduced from Hayami and Godo(2004,p.9):
FAO, FAOSTAT Database, 2000．United Nations Industrial Development Organization,
Industrial Development Global Report, 1998 Edition．United Nations, The Growth of 
World Industry, 1971, 1977, and 1984 Edition. International Labour Organization,
Yearbook of Labour Statistics, 1973 and 1979 Editions.
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 Table 3.  Farm-nonfarm income disparity agriculture in Japan's economic development, 1885-1995
Agriculture/ Agriculture/ Farm / Non-
Industry Manufacturing farm house-
 GDP  Labor  Engel labour Terms of  hold income
per capita  force GDP  coefficient productivity Trade ratio
ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1990US$ percent percent percent percent 1885=100 percent
1885 804 73 45 64 75 100 76
1890 956 71 48 66 67 115 87
1900 1,110 68 39 62 49 102 52
1910 1 , 2 2 6 6 53 26 13 7 9 8 4 7
1920 1 , 5 9 0 5 43 06 25 0 9 9 4 8
1930 1,732 50 18 53 31 104 32
1935 1,992 47 18 50 24 136 38
1955 2,648 39 21 52 55 163 77
1960 3,815 32 13 43 39 169 70
1970 9,285 20 6 34 25 304 94
1980 12,730 11 4 31 25 347 116
1990 17,841 7 3 19 26 428 121
1995 18,866 5 2 17 27 427 108
Souce: Hayami and Godo (2002,  p. 132)
 
Share of agriculture
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1890 14.9 2 0 0.49
1900 11.7 2.7 0.05 1.41
1910 11.2 5.5 0.02 1.09
1920 7.5 4.8 0.02 0.55
1930 8.1 3.8 1.17 1.11
1935 6.5 4 1.14
c 0.58
c
a  Three-year averages centering the years shown 
b  Data of one year before the years shown 
c  1934 data 
Source : Hayami (1985, p. 40) 
Ratio of subsidy 
to net value added
b
(percent)
Ratio of direct tax 
to net value addedª
(percent)
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agricultural       Food Problem   Disparity problem Protection problem
problem
Figure 1.   The agricultural problems at different stages of economic development
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GDP per capita (1995 US dollars)
Figure 2 GDP growth and poverty indexes in Thailand, 1962-2001
Note: Within parenthesis is the year of observation.
Sources:Reproduced from Hayami and Godo (2005 p. 208).
GDP per capita from World Bank, World Development Indicators CD-ROM (200
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Note: 





Figure 3.  Rice premium and nominal rate of protection 
(NRP) for rice 5 percent broken in Thailand, 1950-2002
Churchart (1957) for 1950-54, IRRI World Rice Statistics (2003) for 
1955-97, and The Bank of Thailand Monthly Bulletin for 1998-2002
Churchart (1957), Pookkachatikul and Welsch (1976), and Siamwalla 
and Sethboonsarng (1989)
IRRI World Rice Statistics (2003)
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